Guest Author:
Stuart Laycock
Stuart
Laycock studied Classics at Jesus
College, Cambridge then worked in advertising and
marketing for many years. During the Bosnian war
he helped set up and run SOS
Bosnia, working to alleviate
suffering on all sides in the conflict. He went
on to run Lifeline Humanitarian Organisation for
HRH Crown Princess Katherine of Yugoslavia. He
now works as a freelancer in television. Since
Cambridge he has kept a close interest in the
period surrounding the end of Roman rule in
Britain. He has built one of the biggest private
collections in Britain of late Roman zoomorphic
buckles, and has been working over the last year,
with among others Chris Marshall and Kevin Leahy
to try to answer some of the main questions about
these buckles. He is married, and has two
children.
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Ditches, Buckles
& a Bosnian End to Roman Britain
Stuart Laycock |
The abiding mystery of 5th
century Britain is what causes the collapse of a Roman
British society that had flourished for 350 years and as
late as the last decades of the 4th century still looks
strong and vibrant in many aspects. Gildas,, in the 6th
century, first pointed the finger at the Saxons, yet
increasingly, it seems possible to argue that Roman
British society suffered such a catastrophic collapse,
not because of an external threat, but because of the
lack of one.
Romanised society in continental areas such as Gaul and
Spain, by contrast to Britain, survived relatively intact.
The mechanism for this seems to have been a wholesale
take-over of the structure of the Roman state, by new
owners, in this case new Germanic elites. These new
rulers did not build their kingdoms from scratch, but
rather adopted and adapted existing Roman structures.
Consequently, disruption, though evident, was, compared
with that which occurred in Britain, relatively minor.
In Britain, by contrast, there seems to be a period of 10-20
years or more at the beginning of the 5th century,
between the onset of economic collapse, and the arrival
in force, of a new Germanic elite. In certain parts of
Britain, particularly the west, the gap between economic
decline and the arrival of the Saxons is much longer. So,
if we are looking for the causes of the decline of Roman
British society, we must look elsewhere.
A feature of the British archaeological landscape that
continues to cause much puzzlement is the linear
earthworks, that dot the landscape. There has been much
debate over the exact defensive function these served .
It is perhaps best to regard them as the ancient
equivalent of barbed wire. They would not have been
manned constantly like a parapet, but could well have
been patrolled, and they would certainly mark a
territorial claim and severely hinder certain types of
traffic, particularly wheeled or horseborne traffic. A
modern parallel that comes to mind is the British
Armys cratering of unguarded border roads between
Northern Ireland and the Republic during the Troubles.
For obvious reasons, these monuments provide slim
archaeological pickings to illustrate their origins. Some
appear to be datable to the pre-Roman period, but some
equally clearly date form the period at the end of, or
after Roman rule. Historically, there was a tendency to
take the example of Offa's Dyke, the one post-Roman
linear earthwork for which we have historical evidence,
and attribute the other post-Roman examples to the Saxons.
Increasingly, however, today, such attributions are
rejected in favour of a link to late Roman or post-Roman
British societies.
As has been pointed out, there are plentiful pre-Roman
examples of linear earthworks to illustrate a British
tradition of building these monuments, and some of the
design features of the post-Roman earthworks suggest they
are inheritors of this tradition. Ian Burrow has, for
instance, shown that the Wansdyke incorporates hillforts
in its layout, something alien to any Saxon defences of
the time. Equally, as Morris pointed out, while Offa's
dyke has always been named after its builder, the
other post-Roman linear earthworks, carry generic names
or the names of legendary figures, implying the Saxons
who named them, knew little of their origins.
Its has been suggested that some of the earthworks were
built to hold back various stages of the Saxon advance.
Yet, as Morris points out, the Saxons naming of the
features after legendary figures would seem to imply that
earthworks were already there by the time the Saxons
arrived. If, they had known the British built them, they
could have used names linked to the element 'Wealh'
meaning foreigner (and the origin of the
modern name Wales), as they did with a number of places
where it is suspected British communities survived.
Whats more, some at least, of the post-Roman
earthworks seem unlikely to have been built to bar a
Saxon advance, because they are built to defend against a
threat coming in the opposite direction from the most
likely angle of Saxon advance. Fleam Ditch, for instance,
was built to bar the Icknield way against someone
advancing up it from the South-West.
If the ditches were not built to counter an external
threat, then the other possibility is that they were
built to counter an internal threat. When historians
today describe the end of Roman Britain, it tends to be
in a low-key fashion, with references to gentle decay.
But history suggests that it is highly possible that the
end was a rather more explosive affair. After all, it is
inherently unlikely that potters stopped potting and
traders stopped travelling, unless there were some very
compelling reasons to do so.
At some stage in the period following the end of Roman
rule, Britain fragments. It has been suggested that a
form of quasi-Roman rule may have survived featuring the
Roman provincial structure, and a reluctance to mint
independent coinage based on lasting attachment to Rome.
This is possible, but its hard to see why the
British should show such respect for imperial power after
410, when they had spent much of the previous three
decades in armed rebellion against it. Power is not
exercised in a vacuum. It relies on carrot and stick.
When the carrot, in the form of imperial funding, and the
stick, in the form of the Roman army, ceased to be
relevant in Britain, power would naturally devolve to
British authorities, and in the absence of any central
power, local British authorities. The process is at its
clearest in the west of the country, where, by the time
of Gildas, in the early 6th century, there are separate
independent states, like Dumnonia and Dyfed. But it seems
highly likely that original fragmentation occurs at the
time of the collapse of the British economy in the early
years of the 5th century. As it was no longer possible to
export goods across the country, it is hard to see how a
single political structure could have been maintained
across Britain. If the stories surrounding Vortigern have
any credibility, then some political structurse may have
survived above the local, but even these stories also
contain indications of civil strife, in the form of the
battle of Guoloph, and Kent has a separate British king,
even if Vortigern has some kind of overlordship.
Examples of empires collapsing, rather than being taken
over, are comparatively rare in history, yet where such
examples do occur, extensive violence and conflict
between the emerging independent fragments of the
previous empire is a recurring feature. Think of the
Ottoman empire in the Balkans in the 19th Century, Think
of Tsarist Russia at the beginning of the 20th century,
and even Bosnia, at the end of the 20th century. The
process of different emerging power bases vying for
control of populations and natural resources almost
always creates violence, insecurity and subsequent
economic decline, over a long period. Such a process can
only be avoided by a mixture of control, communication
and (often) external pressure of the sort that is highly
unlikely to have applied in 5th century Britain.
Gildas writing from a 6th
century perspective, perhaps inevitably, concentrates on
the coming Saxon invasion, but he does on several
occasions refer to long term British political
instability and the repeated overthrow of British rulers
in the period after 410. What is more, one passage, may
well give a picture of the effects of political
fragmentation on the British population For
they took to looting from each other, since there was
only a very small stock of food to give nourishment to
the desperate people; and the calamities from abroad were
made worse by internal conflict, and consequently, the
whole area became almost devoid of food, except for what
hunters could find.
Some of the
effects of explosive fragmentation in the Balkans in the
1990s. Buildings are abandoned, building work is
abandoned, rubbish accumulates in urban centres, and
agriculture reappears in urban centres. All can be
paralleled in 5th century
Britain.
The process of such an
explosive fragmentation of centralised Roman control
cannot yet be clearly understood from the archaeological
record, but there are fascinating hints, from which
something of a picture begins to emerge.
Apart from the ditches, another curious aspect of late
Roman and post-Roman Britain has been the apparent
militarisation of the area near where the river Thames
cuts through the Chilterns. For example, the small town
of Mildenhall is heavily fortified in the late 4th
century, while a ballista is mounted on defences
at Dorchester in Thames, and in the cemetery there, a
body has been found with full Roman military belt
fittings from the period. Whats more there is a
concentration of late Roman military triangular buckles
in the area. These features could be argued to represent
a state of general insecurity across Britain, but the
level of militarisation in this area is unusual (the
triangular buckles, for instance, are extremely rare
elsewhere in Britain), and suggests there are specific
reasons. The
image shows a Triangular plate buckle from Sparsholt
Oxfordshire (courtesy of Brian Cavill).
George Lambricks
work on the area raises one possible reason. He has
pointed to the unusually high number of pre-roman
defensive works in this area, and convincingly linked it
to the fact, that the tribal territories of the Dobunni,
Atrebates and Catuvellauni all meet, in precisely this
area. It's possible, therefore, that the militarisation
of the area in the late 4th century represents a
recurrence of tension in this area, perhaps even a
recurrence of tribal tensions.
To suggest that tribal loyalties could have survived 350
years of Roman rule and re-asserted themselves, as Roman
rule evaporated is highly controversial. Yet a similar
process occurred at the end of Ottoman rule in the
Balkans in the 19th century, as, of course, it did more
recently in former Yugoslavia, after the death of Tito.
What is more, there is some specific evidence that that
such a process could have occurred in late Roman or post-Roman
Britain. For instance, the name of the Cantii tribe
became the origin of the name of the Saxon kingdom of
Kent. And in the west, Ken Dark, has done a lot of
valuable work identifying the tribal origins of kingdoms
such as Dumnonia and Dyfed.
For evidence in the centre and east of the country, we
can look to belt buckles. 40 years ago, Hawkes and
Dunning identified a category of buckles and belt
fittings which they associated with late Roman military
activity in Britain. Recently, some have used the
appearance of items of this category on civilian sites to
argue that they could serve a civilian function as well.
This is possible, but the distribution of similar buckles
and belt fittings in continental Europe, almost
exclusively along the Imperial borders, suggests that it
is still largely safe to ascribe a military or
paramilitary role to Hawkes and Dunning fittings. This is
particularly true, bearing in mind that any militia drawn
from the civilian population, or a military force
billeted on them, would leave buckles in civilian
locations.
Over the last year I've been reviewing the distribution
and stylistic variations of the Hawkes and Dunning
buckles and fittings, and it is possible that they can
give some valuable insights into the process of British
fragmentation in the 5th century. And what they suggest,
is that some of the emerging political units probably do
have tribal origins. For instance, a certain category of
of Hawkes and Dunning IIA buckle, in
which dots appear in a row along the loop, occurs almost
exclusively in areas which in pre-Roman times were part
of Catuvallauni territory. Equally, the horsehead Hawkes
and Dunning Ib buckles are absent from most of
Catuvellauni territory, even though they appear in other
surrounding areas. The
image shows a buckle with Catuvellauni dots
from Lakenheath (redrawn after Hawkes & Dunning).
However, the picture
that is emerging is slightly more complex, than a simple
reproduction of the tribal map of pre-Roman Britain, and
again the ditches seem to play a role. For instance,
horsehead Ib buckles are common in the Dobunni territory
to the north of Wansdyke, but rare in the territory (a
percentage of it formerly Dobunni) to the south. Equally,
in East Anglia, while horsehead buckles appear on the
fringes of formerly Iceni territory, beyond the late
Roman or post-Roman Foss Ditch, in the heart of Norfolk,
they are almost entirely absent.
In
addition, alongside the well-known Hawkes and Dunning
dolphin types, I and Kevin Leahy, have been working on
two other categories of buckles of which Hawkes and
Dunning may not have been aware. One group carries birds
on the loop, in addition to the dolphins. The other group
carries human heads. The bird buckles appear in in former
Corieltauvi territory edging over into the fringes of
Iceni territory, while head buckles appear in Iceni
territory and edge over into Corieltauvi territory. The
top image shows a Head buckle from Ufford (authors
collection). The lower image shows a Bird buckle from
Colsterworth, Lincolnshire (courtesy of Rod Blunt).
Much further work is
needed to clarify the picture, but what we may have here,
particularly in the shape of the ditches and the buckles,
is genuine hard evidence of the catastrophic
fragmentation of Roman Britain - the Bosnian option. We
may be looking at a process, in which a mixture of old
rivalries and new ones carved up British society,
destroying trade and communication between separate
entities, weakening British society and opening the way
for a take over by a new Germanic elite.
Maybe we are beginning to see an answer to the abiding
mystery of British history, at last.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
- Dark, Ken
Britain and the End of The Roman Empire, Tempus,
2002.
- Hawkes, S.C. and
Dunning, G.C., 1961 - 'Soldiers and settlers in
Britain, fourth to fifth century' Medieval
Archaeology, V, 3-70.
- Limbrick, George
Frontier Territory Along the Thames,
British Archaeology, Issue no. 33 April 1998.
- Morris, John
The Age of Arthur, 1973.
- Vermaat, Robert
Dark Age British Earthworks An
Interview with Dr. Ken Dark, 2001, at: http://www.wansdyke21.org.uk/wansdyke/wanart/dark.htm
Ditches,
Buckles & a Bosnian End to Roman Britain is
copyright ©2005 Stuart Laycock. Used with permission.
See
also: Late Roman
Buckles in Britain, at: http://www.lateromanbuckles.org.uk/
Comments
to: Stuart Laycock
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